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Notes
CONJOINT LEGACIES-EFFECT OF "SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE"-
The heirs at law of Frederick Lambert brought an action to
recover from Robert Vincent Lambert one-half the property be-
queathed under the following clause of the testator's will: "After
all my debts and obligations are paid I leave the residue of my
estate to my brothers Robert Vincent Lambert and Albert Lam-
bert share and share alike." Albert Lambert predeceased the
testator and the defendant was placed in possession of the resi-
duum of the estate. Plaintiffs contend that the residuary legacy
was not conjoint and hence the defendant was not entitled, under
the accretion articles, to the other legatee's share. Held, the le-
gacy was not conjoint, the testator having divided the shares into
definite unequivocal portions by the use of the phrase "share and
share alike." Succession of Frederick Lambert, La. Sup. Ct. Doc-
ket No. 37,997 (June 14, 1946).1
The question presented involves an interpretation of the will
in the light of Article 1707 of the Civil Code. This article pro-
vides that a legacy is conjoint when the testator has not assigned
the legatee's part in the thing bequeathed.' Whether the use of
the words "share and share alike" constituted such an assign-
ment was the court's only concern, since it was admitted that
without those words the legacy would have been conjoint.
In the early case of Parkinson v. McDonough3 the Louisiana
court adopted what was recognized by the French as a distinction
between a bequest "in equal portions," and one "to be divided in
equal portions." The latter phrase would constitute a conjoint
legacy, the words "to be divided" clearly indicating that the divi-
sion is to take place sometime in the future only for the benefit
of those legatees capable of inheriting at the time the testament
is executed. On the other hand, the words, "in equal portions,"
1. Rehearing denied October 10, 1946. For a discussion of the effect of
this case on prior-acquired property rights, see Comment, supra p. 133. That
note discusses the statement of the court to the effect that the present deci-
sion would be given prospective effect only.
2. Art. 1707, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The legacy shall be reputed to be
made conjointly when it is made by one and the same disposition without
the testator's having assigned the part of such colegatee in the thing be-
queathed." Article 1707 has been taken from Article 1700 of the French text
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. However, the words "the part of such
colegatee" is an erroneous translation of the French "la part de chacun des
co-16gataires," which means "the part of each one of the legatees,"
3. 4 Mart.(N. S.) 246 (La. 1826).
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merely stipulate that there must be a diivsion. No indication is
given as to whether it was intended that the legacy be divided
among the legatees at the date of the testament, or whether the
actual division should take place upon the testator's death. Thus
legacies containing this phrase are held not to be conjoint.
Rigid adherence to the distinction thus set forth leads to the
conclusion that the words "share and share alike" actually op-
erate as a division of the legacy itself, since that clause, like "in
equal portions," does not indicate that the division is intended
to affect only the execution of the will. However, when the court
was presented with this problem in the Succession of Wilcox,4
it refused to apply this subtle distinction and expressed the
opinion that there was no difference in the meaning of the two
phrases, "to be equally divided" and "share and share alike."5
In expressly overruling the Wilcox case, the court in the present
decision gave literal application to the distinction in Parkinson
v. McDonoagh, reasoning that there was nothing in the bequest
to indicate that the division of the legacy was to have future
operative effect. Thus the division comprehended by the words
"share and share alike" must have been intended to take effect
at the time the testament was drawn, precluding any possibility
of accretion. In overruling prior jurisprudence, the court assigned
no particular error or oversight of authority in the decisions in
previous cases.6
But, as set forth in the dissenting opinion, it would seem
that the court lost sight of the fact that no testament can take
effect before the death of the testator, and that the testator must
have intended that the division have only future operative effect.
The use of the words "share and share alike" in a gift inter vivos
4. 165 La. 803, 116 So. 192 (1928). This case was followed on the point in
issue by Succession of Maus, 177 La. 822, 149 So. 466 (1933) and by the United
States Supreme Court in Mackie v. Story, 93 U. S. 589, 23 LEd. 986 (1877).
5. 165 La. 803, 808, 116 So. 192, 194. "It is said that the meaning and ef-
fect of the expression 'share and share alike' is the same as if the testatrix
had given, in terms, to each one of the five legatees named, separately, one-
fifth of the residue of her estate. Our opinion, to the contrary, Is that the
expression 'share and share alike' had no particular reference . . . to the
fractional part which each should receive of the residue of the estate, but
meant merely that the residue of the estate should be divided equally among
the residuary legatees, without regard for the number of them. ...
"Surely, there is no difference in the meaning between 'to be equally
divided among them' and 'share and share alike'."
6. As to the manner In which the supreme court has treated this ques-
tion in the past, both the prevailing opinion and the dissenting opinion
handed down contain a careful resume of prior jurisprudence. The courts
formerly held that the words "share and share alike" did not work an ab-
solute division of the legacy itself. For a review of former jurisprudence,
the reader Is, therefore, referred to the opinion,
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serves to divide the gift into an equal number of portions at the
time of the gift. But a gift mortis causa can only take effect in
the future, at which time it shall be divided "share and share
alike" among the legatees capable of taking. By the mere
fact that deceased left a will, it must be presumed that he in-
tended to die testate as to all of his property, unless there are
words to the contrary in the testament.
The intention of the testator is of prime importance in the
interpretation of acts of last will. As stated in Article 1712 of
the Civil Code,7 the testator's intention "must principally be en-
deavored to be ascertained, without departing, however, from
the proper signification of the terms of the testament." The aver-
age layman knows little of the technical distinctions of such
phrases. If it is possible to ascertain his intention without refer-
ence to those distinctions, it would seem that the rules of testa-
mentary construction would require that this be done. Otherwise,
the rules laid down in the Code for the purpose of safeguarding
every individual right in the matter of distribution of estates
would be lost. MARTHA E. KIRK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - SEGREGATION
STATuTEs-Appellant, a negro woman who was traveling inter-
state in Virginia on a motor common carrier, refused to accede
to a request of the driver to move to the back seat to permit
white passengers to be seated.1 She was arrested, tried and con-
victed under a Virginia segregation statute.2 This act required
designation of separate seating space for white and negro pas-
sengers, directed the driver "at any time when it may be neces-
sary or proper for the comfort and convenience of the passengers
so to do, to change the designation so as to increase or decrease
the amount of space or seats set apart for either race," and made
refusal to take a seat assigned by the driver a misdemeanor.4 On
a writ of error the conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. 5 Held, reversed. Seating arrangements
for the different races in interstate motor travel require a single,
7. La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. Six white passengers were standing, while there were two vacant
spaces on the long rear seat. Appellant was sitting in the second seat toward
the front from the long seat in the extreme rear of the bus.
2. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 4097z, 4097aa, 4097bb, 4097cc, 4097dd.
3. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 4097bb.
4. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 4097dd.
5. 184 Va. 24, 34 S.E.(2d) 491 (1945).
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